China clearly looms large over the U.S. presidential election in November. Both the Democratic ticket led by Vice President Kamala Harris and Republican one led by former President Donald Trump have emphasized the great power rivalry throughout their campaigns, albeit Harris to a lesser extent. Overall, their approaches have some differences—and many similarities.
Trump—and his running mate Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance, who has called China “the biggest threat” to the U.S.—have repeatedly offered a zero-sum view, in which the U.S. and China are at a crossroads and only one can come out on top. (Despite this, Trump also boasts of his great relationship with Xi Jinping, saying he’d like to “get along with China, but they’ve really taken advantage of our country.”)
Meanwhile, Harris—who has similarly promised to make sure “America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century,” a line she repeated at the ABC News debate in September and Democratic convention in August—and her running mate Minn. Gov. Tim Walz, who has a history of engagement with the country, have offered a more diplomatic tone but, nevertheless, advocate for some of the same policies to deal with the economic and security challenges posed by an increasingly assertive Beijing. Harris previously expressed in 2019 a willingness to cooperate with China on issues like climate change, while Biden Administration national security adviser Jake Sullivan recently assured Chinese leaders that she’s committed to “responsibly managing” bilateral ties.
Here’s a breakdown of the two candidates’ records and rhetoric on China.
Tariffs for thee—but also for me
“Taxing” China has been a centerpiece of Trump’s policy wishlist since even long before he ever announced his 2016 campaign for President. He touted tariffs as a solution to the U.S. national debt and domestic economic growth as far back as during a 2010 interview with ABC’s George Stephanopolous, saying “you have to create incentives to have the jobs stay here. You have to create incentives not to buy from China.”
Trump made his wishes come true as President when he started a trade war with China in 2018, imposing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese goods. Beijing responded with retaliatory tariffs until 2020, when the back-and-forth escalation was halted by a “Phase One” trade deal in which China agreed to purchase $200 billion in U.S. goods and services by the end of 2021. (China never fulfilled that promise.)
But by the time Trump left office, his policies had mixed results: While the bilateral trade deficit with China fell from $419 billion in 2018 to $311 billion in 2020, the total U.S. trade deficit soared to $679 billion in 2020—the highest it has been since 2008. The trade war has also been estimated to cost anywhere from 142,000 to 245,000 U.S. jobs.
Trump’s view has been that he didn’t go far enough. In his 2024 campaign, he has proposed to further raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60% or higher and to levy a “10-20%” tariff on all imports from overseas—a proposal that Harris has labeled a “national sales tax,” reflecting economists’ concerns about the costs of tariffs being passed down to U.S. consumers.
“Trump doesn’t get the basics. He thinks his tariffs are paid for by China. Any beginning econ student at Iowa or Iowa State could tell you the American people are paying his tariffs,” then-candidate Joe Biden said in 2019. But the Biden-Harris Administration that came into power in 2021 has been far from an advocate for free trade.
“I am not a protectionist Democrat,” Harris declared during a 2020 Democratic presidential primary debate. At the same time, she added: “We have to hold China accountable.” In the years since, the latter part has seemed to take precedence, as the current Administration has embraced protectionism—maintaining Trump’s tariffs on China and even adding to them.
While Trump’s allies, such as those behind the controversial Project 2025 conservative agenda, have proudly claimed “decoupling” from China as their goal, the Biden-Harris Administration has said that it prefers to pursue “de-risking.” But, according to South China Morning Post columnist Alex Lo, the new term, much like Harris’ broader approach to China, “just sounds less belligerent; the underlying hostility remains.”
In the end, the difference between the two campaigns on economic competition with China seems less to do with direction and more to do with degree.
Project 2025 describes “unfettered trade with China” as a “catastrophe” and the 2024 Republican Party platform pledges to “revoke China’s Most Favored Nation status” (referring to its status as a fellow member of the World Trade Organization, which means it cannot be singled out for less advantageous trade policy) as well as to “phase out imports of essential goods, and stop China from buying American Real Estate and Industries.”
The Democratic Party platform, meanwhile, promises a “tough but smart” approach toward China, saying “We will make no apology in pushing back on unfair trade practices that harm American workers … but we do not seek conflict.” The platform credits President Biden with taking “decisive action to counter unfair economic practices by [China] and level the playing field for American workers, strategically increasing tariffs on a variety of products such as steel and aluminum, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, critical minerals, solar cells, ship-to-shore cranes, and medical products.” And experts have said Harris is likely to continue Biden’s tariff policies, while her campaign has told the media: “Vice President Harris will employ targeted and strategic tariffs to support American workers, strengthen our economy, and hold our adversaries accountable.”
A key part of both parties’ platforms is how intertwined U.S. economic goals are with also holding China’s military at bay. Concerned about Chinese infiltration of critical infrastructure in the U.S., Trump’s Agenda 47 promises to restrict Chinese ownership of “energy, technology, telecommunications, farmland, natural resources, medical supplies, and other strategic national assets,” while Vance introduced a bill in Congress in March aimed at limiting Chinese access to U.S. markets. The Democrats, for their part, have singled out semiconductor chips, expressing concern about overreliance on foreign production of them and restricting export of AI-related technologies to China to stifle Beijing’s military use of them.
Global security and Taiwan uncertainty
Trump has warned repeatedly that he thinks the U.S. is on the brink of “World War III,” and he has pointed to a China-led “axis of evil” (as he put it to Elon Musk last month) comprised of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.
Trump has asserted that his “fierce” leadership style would fend off the onset of war, though he has been criticized for seemingly displaying a transactional attitude toward the types of alliances that are built to deter global conflict.
With regard to China specifically, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the playing field that could turn into a battleground should conflicts escalate over Taiwan’s sovereignty or territorial claims in the South China Sea—both issues on which the U.S. has expressed support for the sides opposing China’s aggression.
On the issue of the South China Sea, Trump’s campaign hasn’t said much, though experts have said a second Trump administration is unlikely to change American strategy that has persisted through leadership by different parties.
On Taiwan, however, the Republican ticket itself seems split.
Although the Trump administration had delivered consistent military support to Taiwan and deepened bilateral ties, Trump said in an interview with Bloomberg Businessweek in June that because of Taiwan’s dominance of the computer chip industry, the self-governing island “should pay” Washington for defense.
When asked by TIME earlier this year if the U.S. should defend Taiwan if China invades, Trump leaned into the longstanding U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. “I’ve been asked this question many times and I always refuse to answer it because I don’t want to reveal my cards,” he said, echoing how he’s previously responded to such a hypothetical. “I wouldn’t want to give away any negotiating abilities by giving information like that to any reporter.”
Trump’s running mate Vance, on the other hand, has suggested that the U.S. should take a more proactive role in Taiwan’s defense. Speaking to the New York Times in June, he said: “We should make it as hard as possible for China to take Taiwan in the first place.”
And in an interview with Fox News in April, Vance suggested that the U.S. should prioritize preparedness for military conflict with China over investing in continued involvement in other foreign conflicts to do with Gaza or Russia: “America is stretched too thin. We do not have the industrial capacity to support a war in Ukraine, a war in Israel, potentially a war in East Asia if the Chinese invade Taiwan, so America has to pick and choose,” he said. “The Chinese are focused on real power. They’re not focused on how tough people talk on TV or how strong our alleged resolve is. They’re focused on how strong we actually are, and to be strong enough to push back against the Chinese, we’ve got to focus there.”
The U.S. approach to Taiwan under a potential Harris presidency appears more clear. The 2024 Democratic Party platform pledged that Biden, who was the candidate at the time it was drafted, “will remain steadfast in America’s commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” and Harris is expected to continue that commitment, as her remarks on the issue have indicated.
Harris, while in Japan to meet with Japanese, South Korean, and Australian allies in September 2022—shortly after Beijing responded with military drills to a Taiwan visit by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi—said that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an essential feature of a free and open Indo-Pacific” and that Washington “will continue to deepen our unofficial ties” with Taipei and “will continue to support Taiwan’s self-defense, consistent with our longstanding policy.” The Wall Street Journal reported at the time that, during her meetings with foreign leaders on that trip, Harris brought up Taiwan in every discussion.
Human rights: to be or not to be (a priority)
Both Trump and Harris have condemned human rights violations committed by Chinese authorities, most notably against the Uyghur ethnic minority in Xinjiang and pro-democracy figures in Hong Kong. In 2019 and 2020, Harris co-sponsored bills aimed at sanctioning those accused of human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—both of which were subsequently signed into law by Trump.
But while Harris and her running mate Walz have consistently called for human rights protections in China, Trump has at times shown reticence about exerting too much pressure on Beijing over human rights concerns when, for him and his running mate Vance, resolving economic issues appear to be more of a priority.
When asked in a 2020 Axios interview why he had not enacted certain sanctions targeting Chinese officials for the abuses in Xinjiang, Trump suggested that the sanctions could derail economic negotiations, saying that they were “in the middle of a major trade deal” and that the tariffs he put on China “are far worse than any sanction you can think of.” (Vance has also complained of China being “willing to use slaves to make things,” seemingly referring to forced labor in Xinjiang, though he only brought it up as justification for trade policy.)
And while President Trump made public remarks denouncing “China’s invasive state security apparatus” tightening over the “free society” of Hong Kong, his former national security advisor John Bolton recalled in a 2020 memoir that Trump had said he did not want to “get involved” when widespread protests broke out in Hong Kong. Bolton also claimed that Trump had encouraged Xi to go ahead with building Uyghur internment camps in Xinjiang.
Harris and Walz are known to be vocal supporters for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. Walz has been praised by activists in Hong Kong for his persistence when he was a congressman in championing an earlier version of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act when it had struggled with support in Washington. Harris, similarly, has been a consistent advocate for Uyghurs and other oppressed ethnic minorities in China, co-writing a letter when she was a senator in 2020 to Trump’s then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to urge “accountability and justice” for what she described as China’s “genocidal campaign.”
During her 2020 presidential campaign, Harris told the Council on Foreign Relations that “China’s abysmal human rights record must feature prominently in our policy toward the country.” She added that Trump “consistently turned a blind eye to these abuses in hopes of earning a ‘win’ in his trade war,” while her potential administration won’t “allow human rights abuses to go unchecked.”
